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Introduction
Family businesses and their intrafamily dynamics provide 
an ideal setting for intrigue, conflicts, and family dramas. 
Over multiple generations, the number of family members 
increases, with each member holding varying numbers of 
shares and either working or not working in the family 
firm. As a result, self-interests can arise, especially with 
respect to business succession (Madison et al., 2016; 
Schulze et al., 2003, 2001). The hand-over brings the gen-
erations together, and family members’ personal interests 
must be aligned (Kotlar & De Massis, 2013; Lubatkin 
et al., 2007). Despite the existence of anecdotal evidence 
and media reports, a lack of research on family firms in 
general and information asymmetries in the succession 
process in particular remains (Madison et al., 2016).
During a long-term succession process, many desig-
nated successors work as employees in family business, 
often without holding shares and with limited power and 
decision rights (Hernández-Trasobares & Galve-Górriz, 
2016; Le Breton-Miller et al., 2004; Schell et al., 2019). 
This creates a principal–agent situation because until the 
final succession decision is made, the predecessors have 
the power to decide who will be the successor(s) and when 
the succession will occur (Lee et al., 2003; Schell et al., 
2019). This also includes the options of business succes-
sion, such as selling the business or establishing a founda-
tion. Dehlen et al. (2014) point out possible information 
asymmetries in this context. However, family businesses 
still prefer intrafamily business succession (Salvato et al., 
2012). This can have various reasons, such as the preserva-
tion of socioemotional wealth (Gómez-Mejía et al., 2011; 
Minichilli et al., 2014), but also that it is the only option for 
the business. In addition, family members may also have 
the desire and will to take over the family business and to 
embrace the entrepreneurial legacy (Jaskiewicz et al., 
2015). In this case, the successors have superior knowl-
edge about their commitment and willingness to succeed 
(Sharma & Irving, 2005). In these situations, information 
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asymmetries can arise and influence the behavior of all 
parties involved. For example, a firm’s predecessors could 
withhold information about the real financial situation of 
the firm to foster the succession of potential and needed or 
wanted candidates. Conversely, successors could hide 
information about their ideas for the future strategic devel-
opment of the firm to avoid being excluded as successors 
due to the ways in which their plans differ from those of 
the predecessors. This type of behavior regarding asym-
metric information can impact the satisfaction of the actors 
who are involved in the succession process (Le Breton-
Miller et al., 2004) and hamper the further success of the 
family business—or even the succession itself. Thus, 
resolving the issues related to asymmetric information is 
crucial for the long-term survival of the company (Cabrera-
Suárez et al., 2001).
The intrafamily business succession process can be 
understood as a contracting situation in which information 
asymmetries can occur (Lubatkin et al., 2007). Schell et al. 
(2019) propose that information asymmetries exist in the 
selection process of intrafamily successors, which are min-
imized through signaling processes. Zellweger and 
Kammerlander (2015) provide first theoretical assump-
tions that governance structures promote agency costs in 
family business succession. Dehlen et al. (2014) demon-
strate that entrepreneurial exit routes favor internal succes-
sors because they create fewer information asymmetries 
than external ones. These results deliver strong support for 
the proposition that agency problems can be expected both 
in family businesses and among family members, and 
there is a need to discuss the underlying cause of agency 
costs: general information asymmetries (Madison et al., 
2016). There remains a lack of insight into whether infor-
mation asymmetries exist in intrafamily succession, how 
such asymmetries are characterized, the extent of the 
asymmetries at different phases in the process, and how 
family members handle those asymmetries. However, 
although all of these studies assume information asym-
metries, none of them reveal the exact types of information 
asymmetries that prevail. For example, the literature on 
advisors in family businesses also underscores that advi-
sors can help succession participants exchange important 
information and identify ways in which to compensate for 
information deficits (Bertschi-Michel et al., 2019; Michel 
& Kammerlander, 2015; Strike et al., 2018). Advisors are 
mainly used to manage the complexity of succession. In 
the context of succession, for example, role conflicts can 
arise (Cater & Justis, 2009). Both family logics and busi-
ness logics must be superimposed (Jaskiewicz et al., 2016), 
and management and ownership succession, which often 
do not necessarily occur in parallel but rather one after the 
other and represent the basis for securing the company, 
generate complexity and the need for communication. 
However, even this strand of research does not address 
what specific information is relevant during this period 
and where it might be withheld. This aspect makes it more 
difficult for research and practice to analyze, accompany, 
and, if necessary, promote the exchange of information 
among the parties involved. Therefore, this study responds 
to the call of Madison et al. (2016) for additional research 
on the existence of information asymmetries between pre-
decessors and family-internal successors—and the extent 
to which and in which situations such asymmetries occur. 
Thus, we ask the following research questions: What kind 
of information asymmetries exist in intrafamily business 
successions? How do the information asymmetries change 
during different phases of succession? What factors condi-
tion the extent of information asymmetries?
To answer these questions, we theoretically derive 
information asymmetries situations and categories from 
the business succession literature. Using these categories, 
we design a quantitative questionnaire, surveying 215 
German family businesses with 83 predecessors and 132 
successors.
This article aims to make several contributions to the 
literature on intrafamily business successions and agency 
behavior in family firms. First, our quantitative study pro-
vides new empirical data showing the existence of differ-
ent information asymmetries in intrafamily successions, 
offering further evidence for agency costs in family busi-
nesses, especially between family members in very differ-
ent subject areas. Thus, information asymmetries can be 
very heterogeneous, and this diversity is difficult to cap-
ture with standardized questions. Therefore, we created an 
index that provides insight into the extent of information 
asymmetries in family firms to enable the comparability of 
the extent of information asymmetries. This index will 
enable researchers and practitioners to easily estimate 
information asymmetries in family businesses and intra-
family successions, allowing a more global view of coun-
tering information asymmetries.
Second, we identify several areas in the phases of 
intrafamily succession where information asymmetries 
can occur. We show that these areas depend on the phase 
of the succession process, the number of actors involved, 
and their relationships and values. Thus, we contribute 
to the literature on succession processes and add knowl-
edge about specific areas of conflicts that occur when 
information asymmetries exist. Thus, we increase the 
understanding of the antecedents of agency behavior in 
intrafamily business successions by disentangling infor-
mation asymmetries.
Third, we show the first indications of which measures 
can contribute to the extent to which information asym-
metries emerge and which measures family businesses 
take to promote the exchange of information and thus 
counteract information asymmetries. We offer evidence 
that a structured step-by-step succession process is a tool 
to professionalize family businesses and decrease informa-
tion asymmetries (Le Breton-Miller et al., 2004). Through 
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these insights, we provide information on how business 
families and advisors can deal with the exchange of infor-
mation and promote it through the use of tools.
Theoretical background and 
hypotheses
Business successions are step-by-step processes 
with three phases
The succession of business management and ownership in 
family firms is widely recognized as a long, step-by-step 
process that occurs when family businesses have been suc-
cessful on the market for generations (Ahlers et al., 2014). 
The recent research divides the intrafamily business suc-
cession process into phases (Le Breton-Miller et al., 2004; 
Michel & Kammerlander, 2015; Nordqvist et al., 2013) 
and identifies several success factors for a sustainable 
business transfer. Succession is a situation in which sev-
eral contracts can exist (i.e., employment contracts for the 
family CEO before he or she holds any shares or contracts 
that govern ownership succession) (Lubatkin et al., 2007). 
Thus, we divide the succession process into three phases: 
the before phase, the during phase, and the after phase.
The before phase describes the succession before any 
management positions are transferred, determining the 
ground rules and the first stage of nurturing and develop-
ing the successors (Le Breton-Miller et al., 2004). During 
this time, family business owners make decisions, that is, 
whether and when a succession should occur (duration) in 
addition to the transfer conditions (and which financial and 
legal approach will be taken). This phase includes expecta-
tions regarding whether and for how long predecessors and 
successors should work together in the family business 
(teamwork). This aspect often results in expectations 
regarding the type of education the potential successors’ 
need (educational requirements) and whether experiences 
outside the family business are a useful precondition for 
succession (Chrisman et al., 1998; Schlepphorst & Moog, 
2014). Whether successors enter the family business can 
depend on their commitment and willingness to succeed 
(commitment) (McMullen & Warnick, 2015). The prede-
cessors may consider potential successors outside the fam-
ily pool (Chua et al., 1999) (selection).
The during phase describes the selection process and 
how first ownership is transferred from one generation to 
another. At this stage, successors should receive hands-on 
training, improve their level of education and experience, 
and exercise increasing management power (Cabrera-
Suárez et al., 2001; Cater & Justis, 2009). Successors are 
introduced to networks and invest in building social capital 
relevant to the family business (Steier, 2001). This period 
of working together is crucial but depends on the relation-
ship between the involved actors, affecting expectations 
regarding teamwork and the time frame (duration, 
teamwork) (P. S. Davis & Harveston, 1999; Kellermanns 
& Eddleston, 2004). In this process stage, the selection of 
the final internal succession candidate(s) occurs (selec-
tion). The previous research indicates that there are selec-
tion criteria that must be fulfilled by the family-internal 
successor (educational requirements) (Chrisman et al., 
1998; Schlepphorst & Moog, 2014). In addition to implicit 
and explicit selection criteria, the decisions of the prede-
cessors often depend either on business logic or on family 
logic (Basco & Calabrò, 2017). Business logic can result 
in human or social capital being ranked higher in the selec-
tion criteria (selection, educational requirement, and social 
capital). In this situation, only the successors know their 
true commitment, abilities, and motivation to succeed in 
the family-internal succession (commitment) (Schell et al., 
2019; Sharma & Irving, 2005). The financial transfer of 
shares of a family business can occur, mostly triggered by 
the predecessors, to maintain fairness within the family by 
giving all children some shares (Sharma & Irving, 2005) 
or to reduce tax disadvantages through step-by-step own-
ership transfer (financial/legal succession) (Molly et al., 
2010). The financial transfer is crucial for the future suc-
cessor’s position in the firm, as ownership is associated 
with power (finance).
The after phase describes the time beyond the selection 
of the final successors when the overall transfer of man-
agement power occurs and the roles of predecessors and 
successors change (Cater & Justis, 2009). In this stage, 
successors are finally the new leaders (formally) and can 
therefore access the company’s financial information 
(finance). However, the ownership transfer is not formally 
completed in this phase. Thus, both the control rights and 
the decision about when and how ownership will be trans-
ferred often remain with the predecessor (duration, finan-
cial, and legal succession) (Hernández-Trasobares & 
Galve-Górriz, 2016; Le Breton-Miller et al., 2004). 
Because the predecessor retains ownership, he or she can 
use control rights and demand a position on the advisory 
board (teamwork, duration) (Cater & Justis, 2009; P. S. 
Davis & Harveston, 1999). However, successors are in a 
position to adjust strategy and use their own networks to 
change important aspects such as advisors or banks, cus-
tomers, and suppliers (Michel & Kammerlander, 2015). It 
becomes obvious if important information is missing such 
as financial or social networks (Steier, 2001).
Information asymmetries in the family-internal 
succession process
In contrast to the neoclassical theory where there is unlim-
ited and perfect information between parties and contracts 
work without problems, the concept of information asym-
metries assumes that information is neither easy to obtain 
nor homogeneous (different contract partners have differ-
ent qualities and quantities of information), and it is 
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neither perfect nor unlimited (Akerlof, 1970; Spence, 
1974). This means that one party has more knowledge than 
the other in a pre- or post-contracting situation, especially 
with respect to motivation, behavior, and qualities.
As mentioned above, we propose that during family 
business successions, several contracting situations 
occur; thus, various types of information asymmetries 
can exist (Schulze et al., 2003, 2001). Due to the fact that 
in most family businesses the leadership hand-over 
occurs without or with only a bit of ownership transfer, 
we have a continuous principal–agent situation: 
Predecessors are the owners even when the successors 
take over the management position. These information 
asymmetries can occur in all three phases (J. H. Davis 
et al., 1997), causing problems for the succession pro-
cess—or even prevent a successful handover.
The overall objective of a successful intrafamily suc-
cession process is the firm’s survival in the hands of the 
family (Cadieux, 2007) and the satisfaction of both family 
and business goals (McCann et al., 2001). Thus, the fam-
ily-internal business succession process can be influenced 
by both family-related and business goals (Kotlar & De 
Massis, 2013). However, these goals can be diametrically 
opposed. There is often a negotiation process (Aparicio 
et al., 2017) among family members regarding appropriate 
goals regardless of their position in the firm (Jaskiewicz & 
Klein, 2007; Pieper et al., 2008). In the same context, 
intrafamily predecessors and successors may favor self-
interest goals, and if that is the case, they will act to 
advance their own interests through opportunistic (Sieger 
et al., 2013) and often limited rational behavior culminat-
ing in information asymmetries among the contracting 
parties during intrafamily business successions (Madison 
et al., 2016).
The research shows that during the succession process, 
potential successors are given more responsibilities, 
thereby increasing power (Cabrera-Suárez et al., 2001). 
However, the predecessor also has power and can influ-
ence the information exchange among the parties. It can be 
assumed that the further the process advances, the fewer 
information asymmetries will exist (Handler, 1994) 
because of activities such as a long-lasting assessment and 
the nurturing, development, and renegotiation of contracts; 
however, until now, there has been no empirical evidence 
for this phenomenon (Le Breton-Miller et al., 2004; 
Madison et al., 2016; Schell et al., 2019). In addition, to 
reduce tax disadvantages, a step-by-step ownership trans-
fer can occur involving both the potential successor and 
family members who will not receive management power 
(De Massis et al., 2008; Molly et al., 2010). This partial 
transfer of shares can be seen as a signal that this successor 
will ultimately be selected as the final management and 
ownership successor (Schell et al., 2019). This can, but 
does not have to, foster the information exchange process 
by building trust and better aligning individual interests. 
However, through the transfer of shares, the potential suc-
cessor receives additional rights to access important docu-
ments and information such as contracts and balance 
sheets (Handler, 1994). Consequently, by ownership trans-
fer, additional interests and engagement are connected, 
creating a demand for information. We argue that manage-
ment and ownership transfers can in each case lead to 
information asymmetries being fostered but also reduced. 
For example, it is assumed that additional management 
power is accompanied by the legal right of information 
(Cabrera-Suárez et al., 2001). The responsibility for staff 
creates access to staff records and costs. These rights ena-
ble potential successors to obtain additional knowledge 
and information (Cabrera-Suárez et al., 2001). Accordingly, 
we propose the following hypothesis:
H1. Different kinds of information asymmetries can be 
observed in all phases of a family-internal succession 
process in a manner that decreases over time.
Transferring information to a group instead of one per-
son requires additional resources (Avloniti et al., 2014). 
The more potential successors there are in the succession 
pool (children, nieces, nephews, others), that is, due to a 
cousin consortium (Gersick et al., 1997), the greater the 
likelihood of information asymmetries and individual 
interests and goals that are diametrically opposed (Basco, 
2017; Taylor & Norris, 2000). In their qualitative study, in 
which they examine the transfer of network contacts to 
successors, Schell et al. (2018) point out that complexity 
increases when several potential successors are consid-
ered. It may even be necessary to transfer information 
from one successor to another (Schell et al., 2018). If sev-
eral potential successors are involved in the process for a 
long time and thus compete or are held responsible for the 
exchange of information, it can fuel conflicts and thus pos-
sibly lead to information asymmetries, which are in turn 
caused or promoted by the conflicts (Jayantilal et al., 
2016). This is especially likely to occur in the before and 
during phases of succession (Schulze et al., 2001), because 
in this phase, several people may be in the pool of succes-
sors; however, who is to be the final one has not yet been 
selected. Furthermore, in the during phase, all candidates 
may work in the company and be involved in entrepre-
neurial activities and therefore also be a part of communi-
cation processes (Nordqvist et al., 2013; Schell et al., 
2019). Ahrens and colleagues (2015) underscore that CEO 
succession contests involve selectivity. In their study, they 
found that male family successors are chosen not because 
of higher human capital levels but because of the contest 
rulers’ gender preferences in favor of male family heirs 
(Ahrens et al., 2015). Consequently, even if it can be 
socially assumed that nepotism and, above all, the choice 
of the successor under the First Born Act no longer occurs 
in family businesses, study results still show that there are 
Wolff et al. 5
still selection logics that include factors such as gender. 
We propose that decreasing the number of potential suc-
cessors earlier and choosing a successor will allow an ear-
lier transfer of information to a limited pool of candidates 
(Cabrera-Suárez et al., 2001). Both—the predecessor and 
the successor—can diminish potential information asym-
metries at this stage, declaring to the family and all stake-
holders (Steier, 2001) about who will become the final 
successors—leading to higher levels of candidates’ com-
mitment, generating more trust and diminishing the risk of 
information asymmetries (Sharma et al., 2001). In addi-
tion, the selection of successors gives individuals the 
opportunity, but also the responsibility, to obtain informa-
tion independently (Cabrera-Suárez et al., 2001). This 
leads to the following hypothesis:
H2. More potential candidates lead to a higher degree 
of information asymmetries.
Regardless of the types of goals that individual family 
members might have during the succession process, such 
family members often share common basic values because 
they have been socialized in the same way (Astrachan 
Binz et al., 2017). The potential and actual successors’ 
general behavior can be influenced by their upbringing and 
shared stories about the family business or values from 
older generations (Kammerlander et al., 2015). The com-
munication patterns in families are shaped by such sociali-
zation (Koerner & Fitzpatrick, 1997). Upbringing can also 
influence the successor’s relationship with both his or her 
family and the family firm. The socialization in families 
shapes the rules, values, and norms of individuals and the 
next generation.
Hillier et al. (2018) proposed that agency conflicts 
between shareholders and creditors are lower in family 
firms than in non-family firms. Yuan and Wu (2018) placed 
this study into a wider context and proposed to include val-
ues when studying family firms, emphasizing values as the 
“key determinant of family heterogeneity and family firm 
behavior” (Yuan & Wu, 2018, p. 284). They conclude that 
a value perspective may explain strategic behavior and 
family business dynamics, and they consequently devel-
oped a conceptual model of family values (Yuan & Wu, 
2018). From their point of view, the behaviors of family 
firms are characterized by a linear connection between val-
ues, which influences strategic behavior and subsequently 
family firm dynamics, which in return influence the values 
of the family. Consequently, it makes sense to consider 
values, especially in family businesses. Values are above 
all individual and can also become group values if the 
social group negotiates them. The congruence of values 
reduces conflicts and creates space for communication. It 
is therefore particularly important in the succession situa-
tion that the actors involved align their values and share 
common values. As a result, sharing the same values can 
result in fewer information asymmetries. Thus, we formal-
ize the following hypothesis:
H3. If the predecessors and family-internal successors 
share the same values, there will be fewer information 
asymmetries.
As in the general literature on information asymmetries 
and how to avoid them (Akerlof, 1970), the same effects 
would be expected in the context of intrafamily succession. 
This could be reached by either professionalizing (Dekker 
et al., 2015; Stewart & Hitt, 2012) or structuring the intra-
family succession process. In 1988, Lansberg discovered 
that a lack of succession planning is one of the primary rea-
sons that many family firms do not outlive their founders. 
These plans can result in both formal and informal actions 
(Botero et al., 2015) such as a business succession plan and 
formal selection criteria for the choice of a successor 
(Schlepphorst & Moog, 2014) enabling a structured and 
long-term information exchange process (Cabrera-Suárez 
et al., 2001). Determining the company’s value and per-
forming due diligence, along with ensuring the successor’s 
access to financial documents, can decrease information 
asymmetries (Wasserman, 2003; Wennberg et al., 2011). In 
addition, contracts with guidelines for behavior and the 
decision-making of incumbents and successors can foster 
information exchange (Aronoff et al., 2003).
As Chrisman et al. (2007) showed, monitoring family 
managers can increase a firm’s performance. They also 
argued that goal misalignment could have a negative 
impact on firm performance. Therefore, managing the goal 
alignment process through a strategically planned succes-
sion process enhances the possibility of a successful suc-
cession. Goal alignment can also be managed through the 
integration of governance structures as Zellweger and 
Kammerlander (2015) first described. Their study focused 
on later-generation family businesses and developed a 
framework for governance structures such as family 
offices and trusts and the agency costs that result from 
these structures. According to them, governance structures 
can either decrease or increase agency costs. We propose 
that the same concept applies to information asymmetries 
as antecedents and, thus, that the existence of governance 
structures, including clear responsibility for the business 
succession process and rules for managing communica-
tions, decreases information asymmetries (Botero et al., 
2015; Suess, 2014). In summary, actions such as informal 
and formal tools and processes, including implemented 
governance structures, can minimize information asym-
metries during and after succession.
H4. Actions such as informal and formal tools and pro-
cesses minimize information asymmetries in internal 
succession and help to counteract their emergence.
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Research sample
We define our sample of family businesses as follows: (a) 
the firm should be a self-assessed family business, (b) at 
least 50% of the shares are held by family, and (c) one fam-
ily member is involved in managing the firm. Moreover, 
the family business should either be preparing for a suc-
cession (before), be involved in an ongoing process (dur-
ing), or should have completed the succession (after) 
(Chua et al., 1999). Following this idea, our dataset 
includes 27.4% before-succession firms, 32.1% during-
succession firms, and 40.5% after-succession firms in 
regard to the hand-over of management and leadership 
position and no or only a partial hand-over of shares.
To assess these types of family businesses, we use data 
from Hoppenstedt, including the addresses of (5.1 million) 
German businesses and their family business status, size, 
and industry sector. A total of 10,000 family business 
addresses were randomly selected, mirroring the range of 
firms in the database with respect to age, size, industry sec-
tors, and sales to generate a representative address pool. In 
2015, a survey was provided to the participants either in a 
printed or in an identical online version via e-mail; 4.8% of 
the companies responded to the survey. To ensure that only 
predecessors and successors were surveyed, we clarified 
the role of the participant in both the firm and the succes-
sion process. Our final sample excluded all cases with 
missing values, outliers that could be identified as input 
errors, cases in which neither the predecessor nor the suc-
cessor answered the survey, and cases in which the com-
pany did not fulfill the above-mentioned criteria. Our data 
cover firms in all three succession phases to catch every 
stage appropriately in the data, generating data on informa-
tion asymmetries in internal family business successions.
To test whether a nonresponse bias was present, we 
analyzed whether the answers of the first respondents dif-
fered from the answers of the last respondents. We sorted 
the dataset by the return date and divided it into three parts 
(Oppenheim, 2000) and used one-way analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) in which the order of the returned question-
naires, in the form of the three groups, was used as a factor 
(Dehlen et al., 2014). We found no statistically significant 
differences between the mean values for any of the out-
come variables by these groups (Armstrong & Overton, 
1977; Chrisman et al., 2004). To assess the extent of the 
sample representativeness and the sample selection bias, 
we randomly selected the survey participants. In addition, 
we compared the descriptive data of our dataset to the 
descriptive data of other studies on family businesses. The 
average age of the firms in our dataset (73 years) was com-
parable to those of other datasets of German family busi-
nesses (e.g., Sieger et al., 2013: 75 years; Dehlen et al., 
2014: 62 years). The average age of the owner-manager 
was also comparable across studies: 49.6 years in our data 
versus 45 years (Dehlen et al., 2014), 51 years (Zellweger 
et al., 2012), and 46 years (Sieger et al., 2013) in those 
studies. To assess common method bias, we designed the 
questionnaire and the order of the questions in a way that 
the respondents’ answers were not influenced by the 
researchers’ underlying expectations. In addition, we 
ensured the anonymity of all respondents to reduce any 
social desirability bias (Podsakoff et al., 2003). 
Furthermore, we performed a Harman’s single-factor test. 
An exploratory factor analysis with all variables in the 
regression (Model 8) led to a five-factor solution with 
eigenvalues greater than 1. Taken together, these factors 
explained 55.74% of the total variance. The first factor 
explained 15.74% of the variance, which suggests that 
common method bias was not a concern in our study 
(Podsakoff & Organ, 1986). A bias attributable to possible 
endogeneity could not be excluded because there are no 
appropriate instruments available to assess this in our inde-
pendent variables (Hamilton & Nickerson, 2003).
Variables
In this study, the focus is on one dependent variable—
information asymmetries. Because the family business 
research does not provide a measurement scale for infor-
mation asymmetries and more research is needed in this 
area (Madison et al., 2016), we first develop single-item 
measurements to check for information asymmetries and 
additionally create an index combining these single items 
measuring the existence and strength of information asym-
metries overall. To achieve this, we thoroughly elaborated 
these single-item variables observing information asym-
metries according to the state-of-the-art literature on fam-
ily business succession (see Table 1).
At the current stage, the areas of information asym-
metries are mostly theoretically motivated and derived 
from the business succession literature (Zellweger & 
Kammerlander, 2015). Through a literature review, we 
identified success factors of planned intrafamily succes-
sions. We did this because when information asymmetries 
arise, the success of the transfer of a family business can 
be diminished or even completely impeded. To use these 
success factors, we propose that all involved actors must 
be aware of these success factors and have the same knowl-
edge and, consequently, be able to fulfill and use these suc-
cess factors. The identified success factors have been 
summarized thematically in the following categories: 
duration, teamwork, finance, financial succession, legal 
succession, social capital, educational requirements, com-
mitment, and selection. Table 1 provides a detailed sum-
mary of the identified success factors derived from the 
literature, the questions we asked in the survey, and the 
categories of the index.
In the first step of the analysis, (single) items based 
on the above-mentioned literature review are used, and 








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Wolff et al. 9
questions about whether, how, and in which fields, 
regarding the identified success factors, different infor-
mation asymmetries can occur, and if they do, at which 
phases of the internal family business succession pro-
cess. In the second step, we determined how these (sin-
gle) items relate to each other and combined them into 
an aggregated variable, the information asymmetries 
index that was designed to measure the level of informa-
tion asymmetries in general and overall. We are aware 
that generating an index means at the same time losing 
deeper information due to the aggregation of variables. 
However, to obtain a global indicator for the extent of 
information asymmetries in a company, we decided to 
create the index. At this stage of the research in this 
field—because a general measurement is missing as well 
as a comparison of information asymmetries across 
companies, the index solution seems more adequate to 
measure all kinds of information asymmetries to catch 
the heterogeneity of family businesses and the variety of 
possible information asymmetries at different phases in 
the process. The index is generated as the mean of the 
nine identified items (representing different areas of 
information asymmetries). First, the mean value for each 
category was calculated. Second, from these mean val-
ues, an overall mean value for the information asym-
metries was generated for every surveyed case. The 
reliability of the information asymmetries index was 
tested with a Cronbach’s alpha (Cronbach, 1951), and it 
showed a satisfying value of .794. At this stage of the 
research, this general index covers all kind of informa-
tion asymmetries to measure them on an aggregated 
level and thus to obtain a preliminary idea of whether 
there are information asymmetries at different stages and 
to what extent and to identify some of their antecedents 
or influencing factors.
The following independent variables were included in the 
analysis to examine the effects of different factors on infor-
mation asymmetries, derived from the discussion of the cur-
rent research in the field. The variable phase indicates in 
which stage the family-internal succession process of the 
respondent’s firm is classified (before, during, or after) (Le 
Breton-Miller et al., 2004; Nordqvist et al., 2013). As dis-
cussed above, information asymmetries should diminish 
over time from stage to stage. To measure shared values, a 
5-point Likert-type scale is used, and the respondents had to 
disagree or agree with the following statement: “The family 
members share the same values.” This question was taken 
from the Family Influence on Power, Experience, and 
Culture (F-PEC) Scale from Astrachan et al. (2002). We 
added the number of overall potential successors to address 
the fact that more than one succession candidate is being 
considered and that this aspect could affect the emergence of 
information asymmetries.
To obtain preliminary insights regarding the effects of 
instruments and measures to decrease information asym-
metries, three variables are generated. The first is measures 
taken where the respondents agreed or disagreed on a 
5-point Likert-type scale on the question “Measures were 
taken in the business succession process to prevent or 
reduce information asymmetries.” The second is the meas-
urement of clear responsibilities or governance structures 
following the recommendations of Zellweger and 
Kammerlander (2015) to determine whether there are clear 
responsibilities or governance structures for predecessors 
and successors to avoid the emergence of or reduce infor-
mation asymmetries. These two independent variables are 
measured with single items because there are no validated 
constructs for the corresponding instruments. We do so 
because single items are easy to understand, do not require 
complex psychological backgrounds (Hair et al., 1998), 
and lead to shorter, easier-to-understand questionnaires 
without repetition or divergence (Petrescu, 2013). In addi-
tion, studies have demonstrated that there are no differ-
ences in the predictive validity of multiple-item and 
single-item measures (Bergkvist & Rossiter, 2007). Finally, 
the tools and processes index is used to calculate the sum of 
five often-mentioned processes and tools in the succession 
literature to plan the family-internal business succession 
process: (a) financial transparency/due diligence, (b) com-
munication plan/strategy, (c) contract for the behavior of 
the predecessor after succession, (d) list of criteria for suc-
cessors, and (e) training for successors (Molly et al., 2010; 
Steier, 2001). These items were measured dichotomously 
and coded as 1 when the process or tool was used and 0 if 
not. The reliability of the tools and processes index showed 
a high Cronbach’s alpha value (.961).
Control variables: To ensure that other environmental 
factors not captured by our theoretical discussion do not 
affect our results, several control variables are included. 
The number of actual successors shows how many actual 
successors are involved in the succession process (Gersick 
et al., 1997). By asking the respondents about the number 
of generations running the firm, we test for an influence of 
possible learning effects from previous successions 
(Cabrera-Suárez et al., 2001). Furthermore, we add the age 
(metric) of the respondent as well as the gender (dummy 
variable) coded as 1 when the respondent is female (Sieger 
et al., 2013). In addition, we add the role as predecessor 
coded as 1 when the respondent is the predecessor to check 
for the influence on whether the predecessor or the succes-
sor answers the questionnaire.
Furthermore, the degree of kinship between the prede-
cessor and successor of the firm may influence informa-
tion asymmetries because the more closely related the 
individuals, the more familiar they might be with each 
other and the firm. Firm size may also influence informa-
tion asymmetries; therefore, we control for the number of 
employees, which is a generally accepted measure of com-
pany size. It has been shown that small, medium, and large 
firms have significantly different (governance and organi-
zational) structures (Haveman, 1993) and that larger com-
panies have a greater number of differing interests at stake. 
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To check for the general impact of industry, the respond-
ents had to classify their firm as one of 22 industries meas-
ured by the European Community’s Nomenclature of 
Economic Activities (NACE) codes (European 
Commission NACE Rev. 2). The answers are aggregated 
into three sectors: (a) agriculture and forestry, (b) the man-
ufacturing industry, and (c) service. We use service as a 
reference category in our regression analyses. In Table 2, 
we provide a detailed overview of the variables in the 
regression models and explain their operationalization.
Analyses and results
Descriptive data
Table 3 presents the mean, standard deviation, minimum 
and maximum values of the dependent and the independent 
and control variables used. Table 4 shows the correlations 
and variance inflation factor (VIF). The tables show that 
there are correlations and that the VIF indicator ranges 
between 1.094 and 3.276, which is below the recommended 
threshold value. Thus, no multicollinearity is present in our 
data (Hair et al., 1998). The highest VIF value (3.276) is 
caused by the expected high correlation between the char-
acteristic of being a predecessor and the high age of a per-
son (.723). The high correlation between the number of 
overall potential successors and the number of actual suc-
cessors (.543) was also to be expected; however, neither 
variable has an impact on the model.
The first goal of the article is to observe information 
asymmetries in family-internal successions at different 
stages. Thus, the single-item variables measuring informa-
tion asymmetries were analyzed as well as the aggregated 
index. Figure 1 provides an overview of these data.
Table 2. Variable description table.
Variable Description
1. Information asymmetries index Index consisting of the sum of nine areas of information 
asymmetries: (a) duration, (b) teamwork, (c) finance, (d) financial 
succession, (e) legal succession, (f) social capital, (g) educational 
requirements, (h) commitment, and (i) selection.
All items are measured with equally oriented 5-point Likert scales. 
The Cronbach’s alpha of this variable is .794.
2. Phase Actual succession phase (1 before, 2 during, and 3 after).
3. Number of overall potential successors 
(family, employees, and external)
The respondent had to indicate how many successor candidates 
other than the current successor were conceivable.
4. Shared values The family members share the same values (5-point Likert scale).
5. Measures taken against information 
asymmetries
Measures have been taken in the business succession to prevent or 
reduce different information asymmetries (5-point Likert scale).
6. Clear responsibilities/governance structures As a measure to avoid the emergence of or to reduce different 
information asymmetries, we used the question asking whether 
there are clear responsibilities and governance structures for 
predecessor and successor. Dummy 1 equals yes.
7. Tools and processes index Index consisting of the sum of five possible processes and tools 
that could be used during business succession: (a) financial 
transparency/due diligence, (b) communication plan/strategy, (c) 
contract for behavior of the predecessor after succession, (d) list 
of criteria for the successor, and (e) training for the successor. The 
items are measured dichotomously. 1 represents that the process 
or tool was used. The Cronbach’s alpha of this variable is .961.
8. Number of actual successors Number of successors in the current business succession.
9. Generation Actual generation of the firm.
10. Age Age of the respondent.
11. Female Dummy equals 1 for females.
12. Predecessor Dummy equals 1 for predecessors.
13. Degree of kinship Degree of kinship between the predecessor and successor of the 
firm (equals 1 for parents, children, and siblings; 2 for grandparents, 
grandchildren, and nephews and nieces; 3 for great-grandparents, 
great-grandchildren, and grandnephews and grandnieces).
14. Employees Number of employees.
15. Industry Sector 1 (dummy): agriculture and 
forestry
Industry sector dummy equals 1 for the agriculture and forestry 
industry.
16. Industry Sector 2 (dummy): manufacturing 
industry
Industry sector dummy equals 1 for the manufacturing industry.
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics (N = 215).
Variables M SD Min. Max.
1. Information asymmetries index 1.74 0.64 1.00 4.89
2. Phase 2.13 0.82 1.00 3.00
3. Number of overall potential successors (family, employees, and external) 1.14 1.21 0.00 6.00
4. Shared values 4.40 0.86 1.00 5.00
5. Measures taken against information asymmetries 3.40 1.39 1.00 5.00
6. Clear responsibilities/governance structures 0.44 0.50 0.00 1.00
7. Tools and processes index 2.78 2.26 0.00 5.00
8. Number of actual successors 1.49 0.69 1.00 4.00
9. Generation 2.75 1.34 1.00 6.00
10. Age 49.78 14.20 20.00 80.00
11. Female 0.19 0.39 0.00 1.00
12. Predecessor 0.39 0.49 0.00 1.00
13. Degree of kinship 1.09 0.39 1.00 3.00
14. Employees 202.80 733.70 1.00 6500.00
15. Industry Sector 1 (dummy): agriculture and forestry 0.03 0.18 0.00 1.00
16. Industry Sector 2 (dummy): manufacturing industry 0.53 0.50 0.00 1.00
SD: standard deviation.
Figure 1 delivers the data that information asym-
metries in the intrafamily business succession process 
can be observed in all subject areas derived from the 
literature. We especially observe information asym-
metries concerning timing and selection issues regard-
less of the phase of the succession process. Moreover, 
the data provide preliminary insights regarding all 
information asymmetries as single items as well as the 
index that in the before phase, these values are the high-
est decreasing over time until the after phase (Le Breton-
Miller et al., 2004). The aggregation of the single items 
to the index does not influence these results. With the 
existence of information asymmetries and a decline 
over time in the family-internal succession process, 
these findings provide preliminary evidence to answer 
our research questions and support our first hypothesis 
even on a descriptive level that does not deliver any 
causal results.
Regression analysis
We used ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions to test 
our hypotheses and the discussed effects in eight models 
as shown in Table 5. In the first regression model, the 
control variables are included. In the subsequent regres-
sions, Models 2, 3, and 4 are run to test the single effect 
of the main independent variables discussed in the theory 
section. Models 5, 6, and 7 check the effect of the varia-
bles that might decrease information asymmetries. In the 
final model (Model 8), all variables are integrated to 
check for the robustness of the former results. All models 
are significant (F-test), and including additional varia-
bles provides a better explanation of the spread of infor-
mation asymmetries (adjusted R2).
The first regressions testing the influence of the phases 
of family-internal succession processes show a highly sig-
nificant impact of family values and an effect of the number 
of overall potential successors (Table 5, Models 2, 3, and 
4). These effects are observed with stronger and more 
information asymmetries in the earlier stages and fewer in 
the later stages (H1). This result remains robust when test-
ing the phases as dummy variables with the during phase as 
an anchor. In addition, the number of overall potential suc-
cessors significantly increased the information asym-
metries in all phases (H2). In the overall model, the effect 
of the number of overall potential successors is not signifi-
cant (p < .082). This is due to the correlation with the phase 
that is also included in the overall model and suggests that 
the negative influence of the number of overall potential 
successors solves itself simultaneously with the progress 
through the phases within the succession process.
A strong, significant negative effect of the common and 
shared values of predecessors and successors on informa-
tion asymmetries (H3) is observed: The fewer shared val-
ues there are between the parties, the more the information 
asymmetries will increase. These results remained robust 
in all models.
The second set of regressions (Table 5, Models 5, 6, 
and 7) reveal highly significant results showing a 
decrease in information asymmetries when the dis-
cussed measures were implemented during the succes-
sion process (H4). In addition, Models 6 and 7 present 
significant effects of clear responsibilities/governance 
structures and the tools and processes of planning spe-
cific issues even during the succession process, decreas-
ing information asymmetries significantly in both cases 
(H4) when these variables are included. Again, the 
results remain robust in the overall model.
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It is also shown, through the insignificance of the con-
trol variables, that the emergence of information asym-
metries in intrafamily business succession is independent 
of the number of actual successors, the generation of the 
firm, the age of the respondent, the gender of the respond-
ent, the degree of kinship, the number of employees, or the 
industry.
To test the robustness of the results, other industry control 
variables were included (22 industry dummies instead of the 
industry sectors) and obtained the same significance levels, 
directions, and effect sizes. Furthermore, the same regression 
models were analyzed with information asymmetries as the 
dependent variable measured as a self-assessment question 
generating similar significance levels, directions, and effect 
sizes, which supports the robustness of our results. Please see 
Appendix I for more information on these results.
Discussion and contributions
Although it is widely claimed that there is limited informa-
tion on the asymmetries and agency problems among fam-
ily members in family business, this is not self-evident, 
and results are often at a qualitative descriptive level, 
delivering mixed observations (Madison et al., 2016). 
Most of these studies neglect the heterogeneity, the impor-
tance of values, and the numbers and generations of the 
involved family members and owners, which might foster 
information asymmetries (Basco, 2017; Muñoz-Bullon 
et al., 2018; Nordqvist et al., 2014). In addition, even 
recent studies finding the first empirical support for the 
notion that information asymmetries and agency problems 
in family business exist fail to disentangle the different 
kind of information asymmetries at different stages of suc-
cession (Madison et al., 2016). Thus, a more detailed 
understanding of how information asymmetries occur, and 
in which areas, is missing. In light of these results, we 
argue that it is beneficial to further address the question of 
whether and to what extent do certain kind of information 
asymmetries occur in family firms during the intrafamily 
succession process: What kind of information asymmetries 
exist in intrafamily successions? How do the information 
asymmetries change during different phases of succes-
sion? What factors condition the extent of information 
asymmetries? Our study is one of the first to provide quan-
titative data observing various information asymmetries in 
family firms in different stages of succession. By measur-
ing single-item effects as well as the development of an 
information asymmetry index, we provide empirical evi-
dence of the extent of information asymmetries and aspects 
influencing the level and kind at the different succession 
process stages.
First, we were able to show that during the succession 
process, information asymmetries exist in general, and the 
phase of the succession influences the extent of such asym-
metries. These findings contribute to the family business 
research by supporting the ongoing discussion on existing 
information asymmetries in intrafamily business succes-
sion and delivering empirical evidence supporting the idea 
of antecedents of agency costs (Zellweger & Kammerlander, 
2015). This insight can thus also provide the basis for 
research strands such as the “advisors in family firms” 
strand. Only when it is known which information is rele-
vant, where there are information deficits, and where the 
actors involved need support can advisory in family firms 
be effective (Bertschi-Michel et al., 2019; Michel & 
Kammerlander, 2015; Strike et al., 2018). That agency’s 
behavior can also or especially arise during succession, 
which Madison et al. (2016) already suspected in their 
paper, is confirmed by the concrete identification of infor-
mation asymmetries.
Second, we can show that at the beginning of the suc-
cession process, information asymmetries are more widely 
spread than in the later stages (H1). Thus, information 
asymmetries decrease over time due to the changing roles 
and influence of the incumbents and successors over time. 
This is especially an increase of power for successors, ena-
bling them to obtain additional information about, that is, 
the financial situation of the firm and critical documents or 
contracts (Cater & Justis, 2009). Specifically, the findings 
provide clear suggestions for which type of crucial infor-
mation must be exchanged during succession, either for-
mally or informally to make a generational transfer of the 
family firm successful. Thus, this research strongly sup-
ports the need for a planned, well documented, and trans-
parent intrafamily business succession. Our study shows 
that, especially in the before and during phases, informa-
tion asymmetries occur. In line with Schell et al. (2018), 
who show that there is a signaling process during the busi-
ness succession situation to minimize information asym-
metries over time, this study provides insights that 
information asymmetries in the categories of the selection 
criteria are highly relevant, especially regarding teamwork 
issues between successors and predecessors, the duration 
of the succession process and commitment (McMullen & 
Warnick, 2015). Therefore, our study underscores the need 
Figure 1. Information asymmetries by succession phases.
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for family firms to undertake strategic planning, nurturing 
programs for potential candidates and a planned step-by-
step handover of the family firm, through these actions 
reducing information asymmetries (Lansberg, 1988). This 
is also because predecessors have time to verify the com-
mitment level of potential successors and assess their skills 
in running and leading a business (Basco & Calabrò, 
2017).
Third, showing that information asymmetries increase 
by a greater number of potential successors (H2), our 
results strongly support the need for communication and 
planning regarding a clear decision about who should suc-
ceed and the selection criteria, supporting the recommen-
dations of the previous research (Schlepphorst & Moog, 
2014). The complexity of information exchange increases 
with the number of people involved (Schell et al., 2018). In 
addition, it can be assumed that conflicts between siblings 
may still be stirred up (Jayantilal et al., 2016). This condi-
tion gives indications that a consciousness, for example, 
via the signaling game, can be useful in structuring the 
succession process and minimizing complexity.
Fourth, our research highlights the importance of fam-
ily members sharing values and thus a form of family 
bonding (Jaskiewicz et al., 2015). Individual family 
members have their own expectations and goals in the 
ongoing and complex negotiation process of the family’s 
internal business succession (Astrachan Binz et al., 2017). 
Common values are beneficial for information exchange, 
and they decrease information asymmetries (Jaskiewicz & 
Klein, 2007). This makes it easier to align diversified goals 
over time if all actors in the process share almost the same 
values and norms (Frank et al., 2010). This behavior of 
problem-solving and handling goal alignment is closely 
connected with stakeholders’ satisfaction of the transfer 
process (Le Breton-Miller et al., 2004). A lack of informa-
tion can result in dissatisfied people who feel uninformed 
and unable to make clear decisions, which is crucial for the 
long-term survival of a family business.
Finally, the outcomes of the study theoretically and 
empirically underscore the need to implement (clear) gov-
ernance structures (Stewart & Hitt, 2012; Suess, 2014) or 
strategic advisors to diminish and overcome information 
asymmetries (Michel & Kammerlander, 2015; Strike et al., 
2018) to reach a successful succession. The support of H4 
suggests that instruments from personnel economics such 
as monitoring (Lazear, 1998; Schulze et al., 2003) to struc-
ture the succession and information exchange process can 
decrease information asymmetries in the family-internal 
Table 5. OLS regressions.
Independent variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
2. Phase −.319*** −.226**
3. Number of overall potential successors 
(family, employees, and external)
.197* .122
4. Shared values −.408*** −.321***
5. Measures taken against information 
asymmetries
−.289*** −.154*
6. Clear responsibilities/governance 
structures
−.310*** −.160*
7 Tools and processes index −.338*** −.209***
8. Number of actual successors −.029 −.041 −.131 −.076 −.037 .048 .037 −.062
9. Generation .026 .020 .025 −.005 .074 .066 .005 .031
10. Age −.096 .083 −.090 −.181 −.062 −.079 −.072 .008
11. Female .042 .013 .030 .075 .068 .041 .084 .078
12. Predecessor −.085 −.305** −.097 .076 −.023 .042 −.077 −.061
13. Degree of kinship .025 .019 −.009 .009 .013 −.016 .027 −.014
14. Employees .122 .169* .085 .116 .090 .109 .101 .091
15. Industry Sector 1 (dummy): agriculture 
and forestry
.105 .067 .117 .104 .119 .118 .081 .085
16. Industry Sector 2 (dummy): 
manufacturing industry
−.049 −.037 −.053 −.033 −.079 −.054 −.041 −.045
 Observations 215 215 215 215 215 215 215 215
 R2 .072 .143 .098 .221 .146 .159 .178 .404
 Adjusted R2 .032 .101 .053 .183 .105 .118 .137 .359
 F 1.779 3.412*** 2.207* 5.793*** 3.498*** 3.855*** 4.408*** 8.995***
 Durbin–Watson 1.616 1.674 1.581 1.701 1.624 1.718 1.629 1.804
OLS: ordinary least squares.
Standardized estimation coefficients are reported.
Significance levels: *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.
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succession in accordance with the literature on profession-
alizing family firms (Stewart & Hitt, 2012; Wiklund et al., 
2013).
Implications for practice
This study also has important practical implications. 
First, it is a key finding that information asymmetries in 
family firms are caused by the heterogeneity of interests 
among family members (Zellweger & Kammerlander, 
2015) in contrast to the idea that family business mem-
bers may suggest that there are no blind spots among 
relatives with close connections. To be aware of this 
phenomenon is important to instate continuous commu-
nication to decrease and overcome information asym-
metries throughout the various stages of succession. 
Second, our study shows that family members of differ-
ent generations have various goals and intentions 
(Aparicio et al., 2017), which may produce information 
asymmetries or agency costs. The existence of shared 
values among predecessors and successors can decrease 
information asymmetries. Yuan and Wu (2018) under-
score that values in family firms could be a main source 
of family firm heterogeneity. They developed a family 
business value model based on Schwartz’ bipolar value 
model. Schwartz (1994) argues that four higher-order 
value types oppose each other to a certain extent and 
form two bipolar value dimensions. For example, it is 
justifiable that values emphasizing change, own thought, 
and action (openness to change—OC) oppose values 
emphasizing on traditional practices, self-restriction, 
and security (conservation—C). Similarly, values focus-
ing on personal success, power, and authority (self-
enhancement—SE) oppose values focusing on the 
general benefit and welfare of others (self-transcend-
ence—ST). It can be assumed that an awareness of the 
different prevailing values in family businesses can be 
useful. In addition, certain value orientations could have 
a positive (openness to change) impact and others a neg-
ative (conversation) impact on business succession and 
information sharing. For example, it is a good idea to 
have advisors accompany this process who are trusted 
by all the actors involved (Michel & Kammerlander, 
2015; Strike et al., 2018).
This finding highlights the importance of the upbring-
ing of potential successors in multigenerational family 
businesses (Jaskiewicz et al., 2015) and the sharing of val-
ues regarding family and business being crucial to the suc-
cess of negotiation agreements and succession (Kotlar & 
De Massis, 2013). Third, our study reveals that the less 
informed potential successors in the pool for succession 
are—regarding selection criteria or who might be a succes-
sor—the more information asymmetries may exist. These 
findings support the need for clear and fair communication 
to develop a transparent plan for a succession supported by 
all family members—with governance structures and 
milestones significantly diminishing information asym-
metries (Schlepphorst & Moog, 2014). Relevant actors 
should know about such asymmetries and address the chal-
lenges they present to develop family businesses sustaina-
bly, and consultancies or politicians should make clear 
statements acknowledging the existence of information 
asymmetries.
Limitations, future research, and 
conclusion
Despite the contributions of our study, certain limitations 
should be kept in mind when considering our results. 
First, the outcomes rely on a single informant per firm 
and the subjective nature of data. However, this trade-off 
must be weighed against the current missing insight and 
the complicated access to obtain data on information 
asymmetries in family firms. Future research should col-
lect dyadic data for a deeper understanding of all involved 
actors (Gooty & Yammarino, 2011). Second, our data 
underscore the existence of information asymmetries but 
offer little information regarding the concrete effects of 
information asymmetries, that is, how and to what extent 
they cause agency problems such as adverse selection or 
moral hazard. Thus, further research should focus more 
on the effects. Although, for example, the study by Schell 
et al. (2019) shows that a signaling process takes place 
during the succession process that reduces information 
asymmetries with regard to the selection of successors, 
further possibilities for dealing with information asym-
metries, as well as the consequences thereof, remain 
unexplored to date. It might be helpful for research and 
practice to investigate these underlying effects. However, 
we report results on how family firms can either over-
come information asymmetries or handle interactions of 
heterogeneous interests to decrease such interests. 
Furthermore, as often occurs in the family business 
research, our study is based on successful German family 
firms that are still active in the market; thus, those firms 
could successfully address information asymmetries by 
finding appropriate solutions. Due to this survival bias, 
our data cannot answer the question of information asym-
metries that lead to failure in family business. Finally, the 
state of information of predecessors and successors 
changes over time. Thus, working with cross-sectional 
data in our study limits the analysis of change processes 
over time. Nevertheless, we have delivered initial insights 
into this topic. However, future research should under-
take longitudinal studies to offer further insights into the 
dynamics of information asymmetries. Nevertheless, our 
study generates preliminary evidence helping to profes-
sionalize the planning and execution of succession pro-
cesses. Even with these limitations in mind, we are 
confident that our results contribute to the research on 
family-internal business succession processes, informa-
tion asymmetries, and strategy.
16 Business Research Quarterly 
This study shows that information asymmetries exist in 
family businesses during intrafamily successions. We pre-
sent new theoretical and empirical insights into how infor-
mation asymmetries can be traced back to family structures 
and phases in the succession process and deliver parallel 
insights into how these issues can be overcome, that is, 
family firms can implement processes, planning, and 
organizational and governance structures as tools to 
decrease information asymmetries throughout the succes-
sion process. The study also delivers evidence that com-
munication in families and family firms is important as a 
function of information exchange. Beyond these contribu-
tions, further research is needed to affirm the agency 
behavior of family members in family firms, further inves-
tigating how family firms address agency behavior during 
the succession situation and in a dynamic setting as well as 
the outcomes of information asymmetries.
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Appendix 1
Table 6. OLS regressions with all industries.
Independent variables Model 9
2. Phase −.213**
3. Number of overall potential successors (family, employees, and external) .097
4. Shared values −.335***
5. Measures taken against information asymmetries −.142*
6. Clear responsibilities/governance structures −.138*
7. Tools and processes index −.266***





13. Degree of kinship −.021
14. Employees .089
 Industry: Constructiona −.360*
 Industry: mining and quarryinga −.067
 Industry: electricity, gas, steam, and air conditioning supplya −.121
 Industry: financial and insurance activitiesa −.114
 Industry: professional, scientific, and technical activitiesa .008
 Industry: other service activitiesa −.117
 Industry: administrative and support service activitiesa −.134
 Industry: educationa −.078
 Industry: accommodation and food service activitiesa −.032
 Industry: human health and social work activitiesa −.043
 Industry: real estate activitiesa −.024
 Industry: wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and motorcyclesa −.327*
 Industry: information and communicationa −.101
 Industry: arts, entertainment, and recreationa −.041
 Industry: agriculture, forestry, and fishinga −.002
 Industry: manufacturinga −.312
 Industry: transportation and storagea −.131
 Observations 215
 R2 .448
 Adjusted R2 .361
 F 5.171***
 Durbin-Watson 1.763
OLS: ordinary least squares.
Standardized estimation coefficients are reported.
aDummy (reference category: water supply, sewerage, waste management, and remediation activities).
Significance levels: *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.
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Table 7. OLS regressions with self-assessment of information asymmetries as dependent variable.
Independent variables Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16 Model 17
2. Phase −.310*** −.258**
3. Number of overall potential successors 
(family, employees, and external)
.142 .064
4. Shared values −.255*** −.187**
5. Measures taken against information 
asymmetries
−.242*** −.181*
6. Clear responsibilities/governance 
structures
−.191** −.074
7. Tools and processes index −.184** −.078
8. Number of actual successors .025 .011 −.049 −.003 .018 .074 .061 −.010
9. Generation .005 −.002 .004 −.012 .043 .031 −.003 .021
10. Age −.039 .143 −.035 −.094 −.014 −.028 −.026 .102
11. Female .105 .079 .096 .125 .126 .104 .127 .118
12. Predecessor −.136 −.358** −.145 −.033 −.080 −.109 −.132 −.195
13. Degree of kinship .015 .010 .004 .004 .005 .008 .015 −.013
14. Employees −.076 −.032 −.103 −.080 −.105 −.088 −.086 −.084
15. Industry sector 1 (dummy) agriculture 
and forestry
.141* .107 .151* .141* .152* .149* .127 .122
16. Industry sector 2 (dummy) 
manufacturing industry
−.139 −.124 −.141 −.128 −.168* −.144* −.136 −.142*
 Observations 211 211 211 211 211 211 211 211
 R2 .111 .177 .124 .170 .163 .144 .143 .279
 Adjusted R2 .072 .136 .081 .128 .121 .101 .100 .223
 F 2.797** 4.293*** 2.843** 4.087*** 3.895*** 3.355*** 3.330*** 5.026***
 Durbin-Watson 1.867 1.948 1.898 1.903 1.840 1.869 1.855 1.959
OLS: ordinary least squares.
Standardized estimation coefficients are reported. Dependent variable: To what extent are/have there been different levels of information between 
the predecessor and successor in your business succession? 5-point Likert-type scales ranging from 1 (very low) to 5 (very high).
Significance levels: *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.
